Using the Bayesian theory of model comparison, a new cosmological model due to John and Joseph ͓M. V. John and K. Babu Joseph, Phys. Rev. D 61, 087304 ͑2000͔͒ is compared with the standard ⍀ ⌳ 0 cosmological model. Their analysis based on the recent apparent magnitude-redshift data of type Ia supernovas found evidence against the new model; our more careful analysis finds instead that this evidence is not strong. On the other hand, we find that the angular size-redshift data from compact ͑milliarcsecond͒ radio sources do not discriminate between the two models. Our analysis serves as an example of how to compare the relative merits of cosmological models in general, using the Bayesian approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent publication ͓1͔, it was argued, by modifying an earlier ansatz by Chen and Wu ͓2͔, that the total energy density for the universe should vary as a Ϫ2 where a is the scale factor of its expansion. If the total pressure is p , then this argument leads to ϩ3p ϭ0 for the universe. This deduction was made possible by the use of some dimensional considerations in line with quantum cosmology. The reasoning is as follows: Taking the comoving coordinate grid as dimensionless, we attribute a distance dimension to the scale factor a. Since there is no other fundamental energy scale available, one can always write as Planck density ( pl ϭc 5 /បG 2 ϭ5.158ϫ10 93 g cm Ϫ3 ) times a dimensionless product of quantities. The variation of with a can now be written as
where l pl ϭ(បG/c 3 )
1/2 ϭ1.616ϫ10 Ϫ33 cm is the Planck length. It is easy to see that nϽ2 (nϾ2) will lead to a negative ͑positive͒ power of ប appearing explicitly on the right hand side of the above equation. It was pointed out that such an ប-dependent total energy density would be quite unnatural in the classical Einstein equation for cosmology, much later than the Planck time. However, the case nϭ2 is just right to survive the semiclassical limit ប→0. Thus it was argued that if we take quantum cosmology seriously, then ϰa Ϫ2 or equivalently ϩ3p ϭ0, for a conserved . Solving the Friedmann equations gives a coasting evolution for the universe: i.e.,
aϭm t,
where mϭ ͱ k/(⍀ Ϫ1) is a proportionality constant; ⍀ is the total density parameter and kϭ0,Ϯ1 is the spatial curvature constant.
It shall be noted that ϩ3p ϭ0 is an equation of state appropriate for strings or textures and that it is unrealistic to consider the present universe as string-dominated. But in ͓1͔, it was shown that this ansatz will lead to a realistic cosmology if we consider that is comprised of more than one component, say, ordinary matter ͑relativistic or nonrelativistic͒ with equation of state p m ϭw m and a cosmological constant ⌳, which is time-varying. Let ⌳ denote the energy density arising from ⌳ and p ⌳ ϭϪ ⌳ be the corresponding pressure. With
, and this gives a realistic model for the universe. It was also shown that this simplest cosmological model is devoid of the problems such as the horizon, flatness, monopole, cosmological constant, size, age of the universe and the generation of density perturbations on scales well above the present Hubble radius in the pure classical epoch. The solution of the cosmological constant, age and density perturbation problems deserve special mention since these are not solvable in an inflationary scenario. Moreover, the evolution of temperature in the model is nearly the same as that in the standard big bang model and if we assume the values ⍀ m ϭ4/3 and ⍀ ⌳ ϭ2/3, then there is no variation in the freezing temperature with the latter model, and this will enable nucleosynthesis to proceed in an almost identical manner. It also may be noted that an almost similar model which predicts the above values for the density parameters was proposed earlier ͓3͔, from some more fundamental assumptions based on entirely different grounds. However, it should be remarked that the argument given above, which leads to this cosmology, is heuristic and not based on formal reasoning. It should be taken only as a guiding principle. Also we note that it has some unusual consequences like the necessity of continuous creation of matter from vacuum energy, though it was argued in ͓1,2͔ that such creation will be too inaccessible to observation.
But it was mentioned in ͓1͔ that, in spite of those successes in predicting observed values, the recent observations of the magnitudes of 42 high-redshift type Ia supernovas ͓4͔ are a setback for the model. A statement was explicitly made to the effect that the predictions of ⍀ m and ⍀ ⌳ for the present model are outside the error ellipses given in the ⍀ m Ϫ⍀ ⌳ plot in ͓4͔ and it was claimed that this discrepancy is a serious problem. In this paper, we study this issue in detail to see how strong is the evidence against this model when compared with the standard model with a constant ⌳ 0, discussed in ͓4,5͔. Jackson and Dodgson ͓6,7͔ have examined the latter model in the light of Kellerman's ͓8͔ and Gurvits' ͓9͔ compilations of angular size-redshift data for ultracompact ͑milliarcsecond͒ radio sources. Gurvits' compilation of such data, which are measured by very longbaseline interferometry ͑VLBI͒, is claimed to have no evolution with cosmic epoch. Several authors ͑for, e.g., ͓10͔͒ have made use of these data to test their cosmological models. In the present paper, we also analyze Gurvits' data to test the new model. Using the Bayesian theory of statistics, we compare the new model discussed above with the standard model with a non-zero cosmological constant, using both the apparent magnitude-redshift data and the angular sizeredshift data. It is found that there is no strong evidence against the new model when the apparent magnitude-redshift data are considered. This is contradictory to the statement made in ͓1͔. The angular size-redshift data, on the other hand, are found to provide equal preference to the standard model and the new one.
The remainder of this paper takes the new theory as given and compares it with other standard cosmological models. The analysis shall be viewed as an example of using Bayesian theory to test the relative merits of cosmological models, a method which is claimed to have many positive features when compared to indirect arguments using parameter estimates. As such, the technique described here has wider applicability than just to the comparison of two cosmological models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we discuss the Bayesian theory of model comparison for the general case. Section III discusses comparison of the two models using apparent magnitude-redshift data, and in Sec. IV we compare the models with the angular size-redshift data. Section V comprises a discussion of the results.
II. BAYESIAN THEORY OF MODEL COMPARISON
The Bayesian theory of statistics ͓11,12͔ is historically the original approach to statistics, developed by great mathematicians such as Gauss, Bayes, Laplace, Bernoulli, etc., and has several advantages over the currently used long-run relative frequency ͑frequentist͒ approach to statistics, especially in problems like those in astrophysics, where the notion of a statistical ensemble is highly contrived. The frequentist definition of probability can only describe the probability of a true random variable, which can take on various values throughout an ensemble or a series of repeated experiments.
In astrophysical and similar problems, ensembles and repeated experiments are rarely possible and we speak about the probability of a hypothesis, which can only be either true or false, and hence is not a random variable. The Bayesian theory will help assign probabilities for such hypotheses by considering the ͑often incomplete͒ data available to us. For example, Laplace used Bayesian theory to estimate the masses of planets from astronomical data, and to quantify the uncertainty of the masses due to observational errors ͓13͔. In fact, this theory finds application in all those problems where one can only have a numerical encoding of one's state of knowledge.
In the Bayesian theory of model comparison, it is common to report model probabilities via odds, the ratios of probabilities of the models. The posterior ͑i.e., after consideration of the data͒ odds for the model M i over M j are
where p(M i ͉D,I) refers to the posterior probability for the model M i , given the data D and assuming that any other information I regarding the models under consideration is true. Using Bayes's theorem, one can write the above equation as
where p(M i ͉I) is called the prior probability; i.e., any probability assigned to the model M i before consideration of the data, but assuming the information I to be true. When I does not give any preference to one model over the other, these prior probabilities are equal so that 
where p(␣͉M i ) is the prior probability for the parameter ␣, assuming the model M i to be true. L i (␣) is the likelihood for ␣ in the model and is usually taken to have the form
is the 2 statistic. Here Â k are the measured values of the observable A, A k (␣) are its expected values ͑from theory͒ and k are the uncertainties in the measurements of the observable.
Generalization to the case of more than one parameter is straightforward. As a specific case, consider a model M i with two parameters, ␣ and ␤, having flat prior probabilities; i.e., we assume to have no prior information regarding ␣ and ␤ except that they lie in some range ͓␣, ␣ϩ⌬␣͔ and ͓␤, ␤ ϩ⌬␤͔, respectively. Then p(␣͉M i )ϭ1/⌬␣, p(␤͉M i ) ϭ1/⌬␤ and hence
It is instructive to rewrite this equation as
In this case,
is called the marginal likelihood for the parameter ␣.
A. Interpretation of the Bayes factor
The interpretation of the Bayes factor B i j , which is given by Eq. ͑2͒ and which evaluates the relative merits of model M i over model M j , is as follows ͓14͔: If 1ϽB i j Ͻ3, there is evidence against M j when compared with M i , but it is not worth more than a bare mention. If 3ϽB i j Ͻ20, the evidence against M j is definite but not strong. For 20ϽB i j Ͻ150, this evidence is strong and for B i j Ͼ150, it is very strong.
III. COMPARISON USING REDSHIFT-MAGNITUDE DATA
For a Friedmann-Robertson-Walker ͑FRW͒ model which contains matter and a cosmological constant, the likelihood for these parameters, i.e., L i (⍀ m ,⍀ ⌳ ) can be assigned using the redshift-apparent magnitude data in the following manner ͓14͔. Before consideration of the data, let us agree that ⍀ m lies somewhere in the range 0Ͻ⍀ m Ͻ3, ⍀ ⌳ in the range Ϫ3Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ3 and accept this as the only prior information I. Let k be the observed best-fit distance modulus for the supernova number k, s k its uncertainty and ẑ k is the cosmological redshift, with w k its uncertainty. We can write the expression for 2 as
Here,
being the redshift-apparent magnitude relation. To do this, we define s
where s is the posterior uncertainty for and let 1/⌬ a flat prior probability be assigned to . ͑These, being the same for all models, will get canceled when evaluating probability ratios.͒ Using these definitions, the marginal likelihood ͑defined at the end of Sec. II͒ for the density parameters is
Evaluating this integral analytically ͓14͔, one assigns a likelihood for the parameters ⍀ m and ⍀ ⌳ in any one model as
where
is of the form of a 2 -statistic, with the best fit ͑most probable͒ value of , given ⍀ m and ⍀ ⌳ . The latter can be computed as ͓14͔
Now, we compare the model in ͓4,5͔ ͑model M 1 , having parameters ⍀ m , ⍀ ⌳ and ) with the new model discussed in Sec. I ͑model M 2 , having only the parameters ⍀ m and ).
The Bayes factor B 12 can be written with the help of Eq. ͑2͒ and Eq. ͑3͒ as
͑13͒
With the information I at hand, one can assign flat prior probabilities p(⍀ m ,⍀ ⌳ ͉M 1 )ϭ1/18 and p(⍀ m ͉M 2 )ϭ1/3. Using Eqs. ͑6͒ and ͑10͒ we can write the above as
.
͑14͒
Our first step in the evaluation of B 12 is to find q given in Eq. ͑11͒, for both the models. For model 1, we have to use
I͑z ͔͖͒, where ⍀ k ϭ1Ϫ⍀ m Ϫ⍀ ⌳ and sinn(x)ϭsin x for ⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ Ͼ1, sinn(x)ϭsinh x for ⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ1 and sinn(x)ϭx for ⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ ϭ1. Also
For model 2, the function g(z) can be written as
where mϭͱ2k/(3⍀ m Ϫ2) for the nonrelativistic era and sinn(x)ϭsin x for ⍀ m Ͼ2/3, sinn(x)ϭsinh x for ⍀ m Ͻ2/3 and sinn(x)ϭx for ⍀ m ϭ2/3. Using these expressions, Eq. ͑14͒ is numerically evaluated to obtain B 12 ϭ3.1. ͑In this calculation, we have used the data corresponding to the Fit C in ͓4͔, which involve 54 supernovas.͒ As per the interpretation of B i j given in Sec. II A, the above is evidence against model 2, but it is only barely definite; the discrepancy is not a ''serious problem'' as had been stated in ͓1͔.
IV. COMPARISON USING ANGULAR SIZE-REDSHIFT DATA
For this purpose, we use Gurvits' data and divide the sample which contains 256 sources into 16 redshift bins, as done by Jackson and Dodgson and shown in their Fig. 1 ͓7͔. For model 1, we use the expression for angular size
Here d is the linear dimension of an object, d A is the angular size distance, and ⍀ k and sinn(x) are defined as in the case of model 1 in the last section. Similarly for model 2, we have
where m and sinn(x) are defined as in the earlier case of model 2. For the purpose of comparison, we only need to combine the unknown parameters d and H 0 to form a single parameter pϵdH 0 /c. Thus model 1 has three parameters p, ⍀ m and ⍀ ⌳ whereas model 2 has only the parameters p and ⍀ m . As in the previous case, we accept 0Ͻ⍀ m Ͻ3 and Ϫ3Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ3 as the prior information I. With these ranges of values of ⍀ m and ⍀ ⌳ , p is found to give significantly low values of 2 only for the range 0.1Ͻ pϽ1 in both the models, p being given in units of milliarcseconds. The formal expressions to be used are
and FIG. 1. LЈ vs ⍀ m for both models, using the apparent magnitude-redshift data for type Ia supernova. The curves M 1 and M 2 correspond to the marginal likelihoods for ⍀ m for the standard ⍀ ⌳ 0 model and the new model, respectively ͑apart from some multiplicative constants, which cancel on taking ratios͒.
͑19͒
The result obtained is B 12 Ϸ1. This may be interpreted as providing equal preference to both models.
V. DISCUSSION
While evaluating the Bayes factors using both kinds of data, we have assumed that our prior information I regarding the density parameters is 0Ͻ⍀ m Ͻ3 and Ϫ3Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ3. The range of values of ⍀ ⌳ considered in ͓4͔ is Ϫ1.5Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ3 and in ͓7͔ it is Ϫ4Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ1. Even if we modify the range of this parameter in our analysis to some reasonable extent, the main conclusions of the paper will remain unaltered. For example, if we accept 0Ͻ⍀ m Ͻ3 and Ϫ1.5Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ1.5 as some prior information IЈ, the Bayes factors in each case become 3.8 and 0.8, in place of 3.1 and 1, respectively. Instead, if we choose IЈ as 0Ͻ⍀ m Ͻ3 and Ϫ6Ͻ⍀ ⌳ Ͻ6, the corresponding values are 1.55 and 1.4, respectively. These do not change our conclusions very much in the light of the discriminatory inequalities mentioned in Sec. II A.
In order to get an intuitive feeling why the standard (M 1 ) and new (M 2 ) models have comparable likelihoods, consider Figs. 1 and 2. Figure 1 is for the apparent magnitude-redshift data and plots the quantities LЈϭ
From the definition of marginal likelihood given at the end of Sec. II and from Eqs. ͑9͒-͑14͒, it can be seen that these two curves correspond to the marginal likelihoods for the parameter ⍀ m in models M 1 and M 2 , respectively ͑apart from some multiplicative constants, which cancel on taking ratios͒. Similarly, Fig. 2 , which is for the angular size-redshift data, plots L ϭ͓1/(6ϫ0.9)͔͐ 0.1 1 dp͐ Ϫ3 3 d⍀ ⌳ exp͓Ϫ 1 2 /2͔ ͑curve M 1 ) and Lϭ(1/0.9)͐ 0.1 1 dp exp͓Ϫ 2 2 /2͔ ͑curve M 2 ) against ⍀ m . Equation ͑19͒ allows us to interpret these terms as the marginal likelihoods for ⍀ m in models M 1 and M 2 , respectively. In fact, these curves rigorously show the integrands one must integrate over ⍀ m to get the Bayes factors. Using the apparent magnitude-redshift data, a lower value of q ͑which is a modified 2 statistic͒ is obtained for model M 1 whereas for angular size-redshift data, lower 2 is claimed by model M 2 . However, the areas under the curves are comparable in both cases and this shows why the Bayes factors are also comparable. This is one of the strong points of the Bayesian method, in contrast to frequentist goodness of fit tests, which consider only the best fit parameter values for comparing models ͓11͔.
These figures, however, show some feature that is disturbing for the new model. Figures 1 and 2 indicate best fit values of ⍀ m ϭ0 and ⍀ m ϭ0.42, respectively, for this model. In both cases it appears to rule out the value ⍀ m ϭ 4 3 that is needed to meet the constraints on nucleosynthesis, a condition which had been stated in the Introduction. Though, as mentioned above, Bayesian model comparison does not hinge upon the best fit values in evaluating relative merits of models, one would desire to have an agreement between predicted and observed parameter values. A natural option in such cases would be to compare the models by adjusting the prior probabilities regarding the parameters so that any additional information is accounted for. But we have not attempted this in our analysis.
The constant ⍀ ⌳ 0 model we considered has one parameter in excess of the new model in both cases. It should be kept in mind that in the Bayesian method, simpler models with fewer parameters are often favored unless the data are truly difficult to account for with such models. Bayes's factors thus implement a kind of automatic and objective Occam's razor. In this context, it is interesting to check how the new model fares when compared with flat ͑inflationary͒ models where ⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ ϭ1, by which condition the number of parameters of model M 1 is reduced by one. This makes the two models on a par with each other, with regard to the number of parameters. We have calculated the Bayes factor between this flat model M 1 and the new model M 2 , using the apparent magnitude-redshift data and the result is B 12 ϭ5.0. This appears to be slightly more definite evidence against the new model than the corresponding result obtained in Sec. III (B 12 ϭ3.1). ͓However, inflationary models with a constant ⌳-term suffer from the ''graceful exit problem'' for ⌳; i.e., in order to explain how ⌳ manages to change from its grand unified theory ͑GUT͒ magnitude to Ϸ10 Ϫ126 of its initial value, some extreme fine tuning would be required ͓15͔.͔ On the other hand, a comparison of the ⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ ϭ1 model with the new model using angular size-redshift data gives a value for the Bayes factor B 21 ϭ15, which shows that these data are more difficult to account for with the flat inflationary models than with the new one. The results we obtained, while using the information I, are summarized in Table I .
When compared to the frequentist goodness of fit test of models, which judge the relative merits of the models using the lowest value of 2 ͑even when it is obtained by some fine tuning or by having more parameters͒, the present approach has the advantage that it evaluates the overall performance of the models under consideration. The Bayesian method is thus a very powerful tool of model comparison and it is high time that the method is used to evaluate the plausibility of cosmological models cropping up in the literature. It is true that since we have only one universe, one can only resort to model making and then to comparing their predictions with observations. Again, since we cannot experiment with the universe, it is not meaningful to use the frequentist approach. We believe that the only meaningful way is to use the Bayesian approach in such cases. Here we have made a comparison between the model in ͓4,5͔ with the new model in ͓1͔. It deserves to be stressed that the recent apparent magnituderedshift observations on type Ia supernovas do not pose a ''serious problem'' to the new model, as had been claimed in ͓1͔. The angular size-redshift data, on the other hand, do not discriminate between the general ⍀ ⌳ 0 model and the new model and they provide definite but not strong evidence against the standard flat (⍀ m ϩ⍀ ⌳ ϭ1) model when compared to the new one.
Here it is essential to point out that Bayesian inference summarizes the weight of evidence by the full posterior odds and not just by the Bayes factor. Throughout our analysis above, we have assumed that the only prior information available to us is either I ͑stated in the beginning of Sec. III͒ or IЈ ͑stated in the beginning of Sec. V͒, which helps to make the posterior odds equal to the Bayes factor. However, when the Bayes factor is near unity, the prior odds p(M i ͉I)/p(M j ͉I) in Eq. ͑1͒ become very important. The standard ⍀ ⌳ 0 model and the standard flat ͑inflationary͒ models are plagued by the large number of cosmological problems ͑as mentioned in Sec. I͒ and the new model has the heuristic nature of its derivation and the problem with nucleosynthesis, setting ͑subjective͒ prior odds against each of them. In the context of having obtained comparable values for the Bayes factor, the Bayesian model comparison forces us to conclude, in a similar tone as in ͓14͔, that the existing apparent magnitude or angular size-redshift data alone are not very discriminating about these cosmological models. It is also worth remarking here that the Bayesian theory tells us how to adjust our plausibility assessments when our state of knowledge regarding a hypothesis changes through the acquisition of new data ͓11͔. Concerning future observations, one would have to say that if the supernova test is extended to higher redshifts and if the astronomers are sure about the standard candle hypothesis, then the theories can be tested for such new data using Bayesian model comparison, using what we have now obtained as the prior odds. In this context, it also deserves serious consideration to extend the analysis done here to other cosmological data, such as those of cosmic microwave background radiation and primordial nucleosynthesis. Hopefully, further analysis and future observations will help to give more decisive answers to these questions.
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